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• ABSTRACT: In the context of psychological theories assuming an internal 
structure of mental representations, Fodor (1983) proposes a mandatory infor-
mationally encapsulated autonomous processing of specifically l inguistic 
input, mainta ining that cognitive skills are neurally localized. He advances 
the hypothesis of a vertical and modular psychological organization under-
lying biologically coherent behaviors. This paper offers a cri t ical reading of 
Fodor's theoretical position i n relation to some aspects of Foreign Language 
Acquisi t ion (FLA), cal l ing into question untenable claims as to information 
processing, mental representation and perceptual analysis. I n view of factors 
other than grammatical affecting FLA, a strictly modular view of sentence 
understanding is disputed whi le a radical connectionist perspective is also 
found fault w i th . I t is argued that a compromise position might better account 
for the complex phenomenon of foreign language acquisition. 
• KEYWORDS: Modulari ty of mind; mental representation; foreign language 
acquisition (FLA). 
Introduction 
Different theoretical attitudes concerning the processing of linguis-
tic acoustic signs are made evident in the current debate in the studies 
of the mind between connectionist perspectives and traditional symbo-
lic models of cognition, particularly modularity. The difference can be 
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seen in the ways these theoretical perspectives treat issues of mental 
representation and of the role assigned to the interaction of processing 
units, the latter being neglected by modular perspectives. 
In the context of psychological theories assuming an internal struc­
ture of mental representations, Fodor (1983), a strong advocate of the modu­
larity perspective, proposes a mandatory, informationally encapsulated 
and autonomous processing of specifically linguistic input and advan­
ces the claim of the neural localization of cognitive skills. This paper 
aims at a critical reading of Fodor's theoretical position by (1) calling 
into question some untenable claims as to information processing, men­
tal representation and perceptual analysis and, (2) discussing the impl i ­
cations of the modularity perspective for foreign language acquisition, 
particularly English. Before an examination of Fodor's theory in relation 
to FLA is carried out, a definition of basic concepts and terminology 
makes itself necessary for a full appreciation of the arguments here put 
forward. 
Definition of basic concepts and terms 
Let us begin w i th the notion of modularity, which is the very core 
of Fodor's theoretical position. What Fodor (1983, p.37) takes to be the 
most important aspect of modularity is what he calls the informational 
encapsulation, which he sees in a "natural" connection wi th a fixed neu­
ral architecture (p.117). Modularity refers to the encapsulation of the diffe­
rent types of information (e.g. phonetic, syntactic, semantic, lexical) 
resulting in the inability of one component or module of the processing 
system to make use of relevant information contained in another 
module. Fodor thus refuses cognitive penetrability of input vertical sys­
tems (p.74), arguing for the modularity of portions of the language 
understanding system, a concept presupposing the composition of pro­
cessing systems as autonomous subsystems, sharing characteristics of 
vertical faculties. 
The term vertical was coined by Fodor to refer to faculties which 
correspond to specific brain mechanisms and display domain specifi­
city, being distinguished by reference to their subject matter. Vertical 
faculties are opposed to horizontal faculties, which are functionally distin­
guishable cognitive systems whose operations cross content domains. 
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While horizontal faculties (typical of connectionist views of information 
processing) are creative cognitive processes exhibiting the interaction of 
such faculties as memory, imagination, attention, sensibility and per­
ception, vertical faculties are distinct psychological mechanisms cor­
responding to distinct stimulus domains, thus being unaffected by feed­
back from any information available to the subject. 
In Fodor's view, a cognitive module is domain specific, innately 
specified, hardwired, autonomous and not assembled. Domain specifi­
city refers to the vertical characteristic which Fodor assigns to a cogni­
tive module whose operations do not cross content domains. Being 
innately specified means that the structure of a cognitive module is not 
formed by some sort of learning process or put together from some stock 
of more elementary subprocesses but already exists as part of the archi­
tecture of the mind in such a way its virtual architecture maps directly 
onto its neural implementation. Being hardwired is a property that 
refers to the association of the module w i t h specific, localized and struc­
tured neural systems. As for autonomy, modules do not share horizontal 
resources of, say, memory, attention or whatsoever, w i t h other cognitive 
systems. If one assumes, as Fodor does, that input systems are modules, 
then one necessarily assigns the properties of modules to input systems, 
which makes the claim problematic, to say the least. 
Because Fodor considers the horizontal, central processes inacces­
sible to scientific investigation ("it is only the modular systems that we 
have any hope to understand") (1983, p.38), he bans them from this the­
ory as they are taken to be nonmodular. As Fodor argues (1983, p.83), 
central processes - problem solving and the like - are characterized by 
cognitive penetrability, being thus unencapsulated and consequently 
not plausibly viewed as modular. The notion of penetrability implies that 
input processes are importantly affected by the subject's beliefs concer­
ning contextual or background information, which runs against the claim 
put forward by Fodor that input systems are informationally encapsulated 
thus not crossing content domains. In fact, the only associative relation 
Fodor allows for is a relation at a level of representation sufficiently super­
ficial to be insensitive to the semantic content of the entities involved. 
As an illustration of this point, Fodor offers the example of the associa­
tive relation among lexical forms between "spy" and "bug" to guide lexi­
cal access. The next section presents some common criticisms of Fodor's 
views. 
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Some crit icisms of Fodor's v iews 
Fodor's position, which postulates 1. structured representations, 2. 
structure-sensitive mental process, and 3. an individuated class of input 
analyzers which are distinct from central cognitive mechanisms (ibi­
dem, p.43), is questioned by many theorists committed to different 
views of the processing systems and of the nature of the mind. 
A n example is Gasser's criticism (1990, p.179): " i t [Fodor's view] 
suffers from a very unhuman-like brittleness": As linguistic and concep­
tual entities are assigned in an all-to-one fashion to categories, rules 
typically apply in a fixed sequence, and deviations from expected pat­
terns are not handled well , if at all. Gasser argues for the connectionist 
architecture which, i n the most orthodox version, recognizes no combi­
natorial structure in mental representations and denies the existence of 
discrete symbols and rules as such, embodying theories of the mind 
based on the interaction of large numbers of neuron-like processing 
units. 
Without subscribing to the orthodox connectionist view (evidences 
offered by aphasiology favor specialized and localized centers) I would 
like to call into question Fodor's proposal for an encapsulated, autono­
mous and mandatory processing system, focusing on the issue of 
foreign language acquisition. 
Assuming that input systems are informationally encapsulated 
implies the acceptance of the claim that their operations are in some 
respects unaffected by feedback from any information available to the 
subject. As Fodor's argument goes, a system can be autonomous by 
being encapsulated and by not having access to facts other systems 
know about. In fact, Fodor (1983) refuses "the cognitive penetrability of 
input systems" (p.774) and the interaction between input analyses and 
background knowledge (p.73). 
This theoretical perspective does not seem to hold when i t comes 
to real processing by real human beings. Perception of novelty does NOT 
depend solely on bottom-up-to-top perceptual mechanism: Modules 
"leak" or overlap and the confirmation function for input systems must 
rely on information the organism internally represents. 
The autonomy advocated by Fodor, which refers to constraints on 
the information flow, cannot sensibly be accepted. As input processes 
ARE crucially affected by the subject's appreciation of semantic context 
or "real world" background, not only syntactic information is used in 
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syntactic parsing, but there is a relationship of the semantic memory 
with the world knowledge held by the subject, which is brought to bear 
in the processing of incoming information. 
By refusing contextual facilitation of lexical access (ibidem, p.80), 
Fodor does not consider the existence of a module for the elaboration of 
mental representations integrating crossed information, which accounts 
for his claim that 'large memories are searched slowly" (p.70). This is 
another aspect which does not stand close investigation: A subject is, i n 
fact, sensitive to what he knows and he can get at what he knows about 
the world very fast. 
One more fact has to be considered: language has a creative and 
dynamic aspect to it . However, this is denied in the modular approach. 
As a consequence, modularity bans creative processes from the scope of 
science. In fact, thought and language cannot be separated on those 
grounds: perception (or production) of verbal sounds is impossible without 
meaning or intentionality or creativity, aspects crucial to the very nature 
of language processing and producing. This last issue is explored in the 
following subsection. 
The modularity of mind and 
Foreign Language Acquis i t ion 
In the context of Foreign Language Acquisition (FLA), the modular 
approach also encounters serious resistance as i t suffers from limitations 
in its account of information processing and in its refusal to acknow­
ledge the importance of contextual and background information in per­
ceptual analysis. If contextual factors are important in first language 
acquisition they are even more crucial in foreign language acquisition. 
It is an established fact that modules overlap in the acquisition of 
a Foreign Language (FL). Some examples illustrating this point can be 
found in Hatch et al. (1990, p.699), where approaches to Second Lan­
guage Acquisit ion are brought up for discussion in terms of systems for 
language production: 
For instance, we know the errors in third-person singular present tense 
may be either a representation problem in morphology or a phonology problem 
(the difficulty of consonant clusters) or both. A modular approach to phonology 
would simply ignore the overlap. 
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What is highlighted in this quote is the fact that a radical modular 
view cannot account for acquisitional matters, the isolation of a mor­
phological module and of a phonological model being an example of the 
disputability of such a claim. 
Another example of module overlapping refers to the representa­
t ion of definite and indefinite articles and pronouns, which cannot be 
accurately studied apart from the discourse framework in which they 
occur. These forms depend on the role of the noun phrase w i t h i n a par­
ticular context (see Hatch et al., 1990, for a thorough discussion). 
C o n c e r n i n g the i n t e g r a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
a n i n c o m i n g s t r e a m of sounds, some theor i s t s go as far as t o say t h a t 
"not o n l y k n o w l e d g e m u s t be a c t i v a t e d i n t h e e x e c u t i o n of these proces­
ses, bu t also opinions, at t i tudes, values and emot ions" (van Dijk & Kintsch , 
1983, p.334). The hearer, i t is c l a imed , has to keep t r ack of h is or her o w n 
wishes , interests , goals a n d p lans , w h i c h exert a m o n i t o r i n g f u n c t i o n o n 
a l l t he other componen t s of the comprehens ion process. A l l these factors 
do affect comprehens ion a n d are i n v o l v e d i n i t i n one w a y or another. I f 
th i s is t r ue of na t ive l anguage processing, the i m p l i c a t i o n s for fo re ign l a n ­
guage process ing are even more serious: here, the i n d i v i d u a l has to d r a w 
u p o n any and a l l i n f o r m a t i o n avai lable , w h i c h he/she has t o in t eg ra t e i n t o 
t h e i n t e rp r e t a t i on of the i n c o m i n g s t ream of sounds, w h i c h , b y force of 
the i r "foreign" nature , are harder to process. The t h e o r y of t h e i n f o r m a t i o ­
n a l e n c a p s u l a t i o n of i n p u t sys tems c a n n o t a c c o u n t for the p rocess ing of 
a fo re ign l a n g u a g e i n v i e w of i t s refusal t o a c k n o w l e d g e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n 
b e t w e e n i n p u t analyses, c o n t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n , b a c k g r o u n d k n o w ­
ledge a n d a t t i t udes , as w e l l as t h e va lues a n d emot ions of t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
s t r i v i n g to acqu i r e t h i s n e w f o r m of k n o w l e d g e . 
Another issue meriting closer investigation is the mandatory qua­
l i ty assigned to the operations of the input system in modular approa­
ches. Fodor (1983) claims that the kind of processing operations obser­
vable in spoken word recognition are mediated by automatic processes 
which are obligatorily applied: "you can't help hearing an utterance of a 
sentence as an utterance of a sentence" (p.52), or "you can't hear speech 
as noise even if you would prefer to" (p.53). So goes his argument. 
The immediate implication of this claim is the belief that proces­
sing takes place independently of the subject's w i l l . When it comes to 
meta-recognition, however, such a claim displays an open flank. As 
Scliar-Cabral (1991, p.135) points out, the issue of unknown languages 
is not accounted for in Fodor's scheme: what happens is a rejection of 
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whatever speech stream which cannot be processed due to lack of know­
ledge of the respective system of verbal language. In this case, speech is 
heard as noise and is rejected. In reality, there is a gradation from auto­
matic to creative processes, as Scliar-Cabral (p. 127) points out: the lower 
the process, the more unconscious, automatic, mandatory and culturally-
unbound i t is, as happens, for example, w i th phonological and morpho-
phonemic rules. In view of this, the mandatory property would have to 
be revised, at least in relation to foreign language processing. 
Fina l remarks 
Fodor's claims that 1. there is one distinct component of the human 
cognitive system responsible for identifying the grammatical characte­
ristics of a sentence, a module devoted to syntactic processing alone, 
and that 2. syntactic information represents a distinct type of input do 
not stand close scrutiny. As the reflections made i n this paper have tried 
to demonstrate, a strictly modular view of sentence understanding suffers 
from serious limitations when i t comes to language acquisition matters, 
particularly in relation to foreign language acquisrtion: the extremist 
modular view, which denies any leakage and overlapping among the 
components, constitute an unacceptable orthodox position. On the 
other hand, however, radical connectronist approaches to the studies of 
the mind, which deny any kind of mental architecture and recognize no 
combinatorial structure in mental representations, are equally made-
quate to offer a satisfactory account of FLA. 
It is suggested here that a compromise between the two extremes 
could go beyond the narrow confines of the informational encapsulation 
approach while allowing for some kind of mental organization. In other 
words, maybe perhaps some modularity in connectionist models. This, 
i t is here argued, might provide acquisitional studies w i t h a more feasi­
ble account for such a complex phenomenon as the processing of inco­
ming streams as well as the production of foreign sounds. 
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VASCONCELLOS, M . L. A modularidade da mente e o processo de aquisição de 
língua estrangeira: uma leitura crítica da proposta de Fodor. Alfa (São Paulo), 
v.43, p.105-112, 1999. 
• RESUMO: No contexto de teorias psicológicas que assumem uma estrutura 
interna das representações mentais, Fodor (1983) propõe um processamento 
mandatório e autônomo, com encapsulamento de informação, para "input" 
especificamente lingüístico, apresentando a hipótese da existência de uma 
organização modular e vertical, subjazendo comportamentos biologicamente 
coerentes. Este trabalho apresenta uma leitura crítica da posição teórica de 
Fodor, em relação a certos aspectos do processo de aquisição de língua estran-
geira, questionando algumas afirmações insustentáveis quanto ao processa-
mento de informação, à representação mental e à análise perceptual. Face a fato-
res que transcendem os aspectos gramaticais no processo de aquisição de 
liíngua estrangeira, questiona-se a visão estritamente modular de processa-
mento de sentenças, mas, ao mesmo tempo, critica-se a perspectiva conexionista 
radical Argumenta-se que uma posição intermediária poderia dar conta, com 
mais propriedade, do complexo fenômeno de aquisição de língua estrangeira. 
• PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Modularidade da mente; aquisição de língua estrangeira. 
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